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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
GIRATO KAMILLO PHILLIP, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20150278-CA 
Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)0). See Addendum A 
(Sentence, judgment, Commitment); R.112-13, 123-24. The Utah Supreme Court 
transferred the appeal to this Court. R.123-24. 
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Whether the district court erred in concluding that it could revoke defendant's 
probation for conduct that occurred when AP &P was not supervising his probation? 
Standard of Review: This Court generally reviews a district court's decision to 
revoke probation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wellington, 2015 UT App 12, if6, 
343 P.3d 328. But the question in this case concerns the scope of judicial authority to 
revoke probation, and "[ q]uestions of the scope of judicial authority are reviewed for 
correctness." Oliphant v. Estate of Brunetti, 2002 UT App 375, if7, 64 P.3d 587; see also 
In re Discipline of Alex, 2004 UT 81, if29, 99 P.3d 865 ("Whether the March 22 order 
exceeded the scope of the district court's authority under Rule 27 is a question oflaw we 
review for correctness, without deference to the district court's interpretation."). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R.129:1-29. 
Issue II: Whether the district court erred in concluding that it could revoke 
defendant's probation when the record indicated that defendant did not willfully violate 
his probation? 
Standard of Review: On appeal, a defendant "must show that the evidence of a 
probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, is so 
deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking defendant's probation." State 
v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotations omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R. 129:5, 21-25. But if it is not, this Court 
may review it for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. "Under the plain error 
standard, [this Court] may reverse the district court on an issue not properly preserved for 
appeal when a party can show the following: '[l][a]n error exists; [2] the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful. ... "' State v. Powell, 
2007 UT 9, ,r 18, 154 P.3d 788, 794. And, to support an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, a defendant must demonstrate, first, "that counsel's performance was deficient" 
and, second, "that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial." State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, if 19, 12 P.3d 92. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
The following are attached at Addendum B: Utah Code §77-18-1. Utah Code §64-
13-21. Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 11. 18 U.S.C. § 3603. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
On April 15, 2011, Girato Kamilo Phillip ("Mr. Phillip") pleaded guilty pursuant 
to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to Aggravated Robbery for an 
incident occurring on December 26, 2010. Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 11. R.34-36, 40-46; 
135:1-4; R.136:3. Mr. Phillip took responsibility for being part of a group of people who 
used force to take money from a convenience store clerk. R. 40-46; 136:3. In addition, 
the "codefendant was armed with a baseball bat." R. 136:3. 
Mr. Phillip was sentenced immediately after entering his plea. R. 136:5. The 
district court suspended the five-years-to-life prison sentence and placed Mr. Phillip on 
supervised probation for 36 months. R.34-36; 136:5. Among the conditions of probation 
were that probation was zero tolerance, that Mr. Phillip serve 365 days in jail, that Mr. 
Phillip not use or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, and that Mr. Phillip not violate any 
laws. R.35. 136:5-6. The order of probation stated: "Probation is to be supervised by 
Adult Probation & Parole" (AP&P). R.35. The sentencing judge told Mr. Phillip, "Today 
we have all agreed that you are going to do a year in jail and then go to AP&P probation, 
but you need to understand that if you don't comply with probation and do everything 
they tell you, a judge could bring you back and sentence you to [the] maximum amount." 
R. 136:4. See also 136:2. (Based upon the plea bargain, the parties anticipated that "after 
the [365 days in] jail [Mr. Phillip] goes to AP&P."). 
Approximately one month after Mr. Phillip was sentenced in this matter, he 
addressed an Aggravated Assault case where his AP &P supervision was terminated for 
that matter and a zero-to-five-year prison commitment was imposed. R.129:1-2, 7, 9-10, 
3 
30. As Judge Kouris recognized, Mr. Phillip was not in prison when he was sentenced in 
this matter, but was sentenced to prison on a subsequent date for the Aggravated Assault 
case. R. 129:9. Mr. Phillip, however, was in jail when he was sentenced in this matter and 
had been from the start of this matter up until the time he was sentenced to prison for the 
Aggravated Assault case. R.11, 26, 31;129:9, 30; 133:2. 
At some point when Mr. Phillip was in prison, AP&P closed its file on Mr. 
Phillip's probation for this Aggravated Robbery matter. R.51-52; 129: 1-2, 9-10. After 
serving approximately two years in prison, Mr. Phillip was paroled in the Aggravated 
Assault case. R.129:1-2, 9-10, 50. AP&P supervised Mr. Phillip's parole, the conditions 
of which were materially the same as the conditions of his probation in this matter. 1 
R.129:2-3, 4, 6, 12, 15, 21. 
On February 20, 2014, more than 34 months after Mr. Phillip was sentenced in 
this matter, AP&P filed an affidavit in support of an order to show cause alleging that Mr. 
Phillip committed seven probation violations for this matter. R.48-49. Specifically, the 
affidavit alleged that Mr. Phillip failed to establish a residence of record, changed his 
residence without AP&P's permission, consumed alcohol on four separate occasions, and 
failed to submit to drug tests. R.48-49. In AP&P's probation violation report, the 
1 Utah R.Evid. 201 allows this Court to take judicial notice that the Aggravated Assault 
case that sent Mr. Phillip to prison is case 091900040FS. See Mel Trimble Real Estate v. 
Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451,456 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State v. Bates, 
22 Utah 65, 61 P. 905 (1900) ("Courts will generally take judicial notice of whatever 
ought to be generally known within the limits of their jurisdiction, and particularly will 
they take notice of the records and prior proceedings in the same case."). 
4 
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probation officer noted that AP&P had "inadvertently closed out [Mr. Phillip's] probation 
case (in [AP&P's] system)," and that he "wasn't aware Mr. Phillip was on probation for 
this case until this last week." R.51-52. On September 25, 2014, AP&P filed an amended 
affidavit alleging three additional probation violations: possession of a controlled 
substance, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, and assault. R.62-63. 
The district court issued an order to show cause. R.69-70, 73-74. At a hearing on 
the order to show cause, Mr. Phillip denied the alleged probation violations. R.108-09. At 
the evidentiary hearing held March 20, 2015, Mr. Phillip had the assistance of an Arabic 
interpreter, as he did for the other hearings in this matter. R.24-25, 32, 36, 108, 11 O; 
134: 1; 136:2. 
At the evidentiary hearing, the unnamed probation officer said that AP&P had 
erroneously closed Mr. Phillip's probation file when Mr. Phillip was serving his prison 
sentence in the other case. R.129 :9. See also R. 51. He noticed the error after Mr. Phillip 
was paroled and he erased the "end date" for Mr. Phillip's probation in AP&P's system. 
R.129:9. He said that he didn't think Mr. Phillip ever initiated his probation with AP&P 
because he was in custody when he was sentenced. R.129:20. 
The district court judge acknowledged that a finding of a probation violation in 
this matter would "carry a greater consequence" for Mr. Phillip than if he was at the 
prison for only the case where the zero-to-five-year sentence was imposed. R. 129:7. 
Furthermore, the district court agreed that Mr. Phillip could not be found to violate 
conditions of probation of which he lacked notice. R.129:20-23. The court specifically 
expressed a concern about whether Mr. Phillip could violate a condition of probation if 
5 
he didn't know what it was. R.129:21. Consequently, the court found that because AP&P 
closed this matter in its system, Mr. Phillip lacked adequate notice of the conditions that 
he establish a residence of record with AP&P, inform AP&P of any change in residence, 
and submit to drug tests. R.129:25-26. Accordingly, the court struck the allegations that 
Mr. Phillip violated those conditions. R.129:25-26. 
However, the district court concluded that AP&P lacked authority to terminate 
probation and so Mr. Phillip's probation could be revoked regardless of whether AP&P 
was supervising it. R.129:15-16, 18-19, 25. In light of the court's conclusion, Mr. Phillip 
did not challenge the factual basis for the remaining allegations and no evidence was 
taken. R.129:27-28. The district court found that Mr. Phillip committed seven probation 
violations: consuming alcohol on four occasions, committing assault, possessing a 
controlled substance, and carrying a dangerous weapon. R.129:29. It revoked Mr. 
Phillip's probation and imposed the original prison sentence of five-years-to-life. R.112-
13; 129:31-32. The matter was ordered to run concurrent to Mr. Phillip's other prison 
commitment matter. 129:32. Mr. Phillip timely appealed the district court's imposition of 
the prison commitment in this matter. R. 117, 121-122. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court erred when it concluded that it could revoke Mr. Phillip's 
probation for conduct that occurred when AP&P was not supervising his probation. The 
pertinent statutory provision implies that supervision by the Department of Corrections, 
i.e., AP&P, is necessary for probation. Thus, a defendant's probation cannot be revoked 





probation order also indicates that AP&P's supervision was a necessary condition of Mr. 
Phillip's probation. Accordingly, because AP&P was not supervising Mr. Phillip's 
probation in this matter, this Court should reverse the trial court's finding that Mr. 
Phillip's probation could be revoked in this matter. 
The district court erred when it concluded that it could revoke Mr. Phillip's 
probation where the record indicates that Mr. Phillip did not willfully violate his 
probation. Mr. Phillip did not willfully violate his probation because there was no reason 
for Mr. Phillip to know or believe that he was on probation. Accordingly, this Court 




The district court erred in concluding that it could revoke Mr. Phillip's 
probation for conduct that occurred when AP&P was not supervising 
his probation. 
Mr. Phillip could not have violated probation where AP&P had closed its file on 
his probation and was not supervising him. 
Utah's probation statute provides, in pertinent part: 
On a plea of guilty, ... or conviction of any crime or offense, the court may, 
after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the 
defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections ... ; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
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Utah Code §77-18-1(2)(a).2 Hence, there are three possibilities for probation. The 
defendant may be put on probation (1) "under the supervision of the Department of 
Corrections" (the Department), (2) "with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization," or (3) "on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court." 
§77-18-1 (2)(a). 
In this case, the district court put Mr. Phillip on probation "to be supervised by 
[AP&P]," R.35, which is a division of the Department. See §63M-7-404(6),(7); §77-40-
107(4). The plain language of the statute implies that where, as here, a court places a 
defendant on probation "under the supervision of the Department," the Department's 
supervision is a necessary condition of the defendant's probation. §77-18-1(2)(a)(i). 
Indeed, if the Department terminates supervision, the defendant is no longer "on 
probation under the supervision of the Department." § 77-18-1 (2)( a)(i). Thus, under the 
probation statute, the Department effectively closes probation by not supervising it. The 
district court judge was therefore mistaken that the Department "can't close" probation. 
R.129:12. 
Furthermore, the plain language of the district court's probation order also 
indicates that AP&P's supervision was a necessary condition of Mr. Phillip's probation. 
2 The version of section §77-18-1(2)(a) that was "in effect at the time of the incident 
underlying this appeal" does "not differ substantively from the current version," so this 
brief cites to the current version for the Court's convenience. State v. Ellis, 2014 UT App 





The order expressly stated that Mr. Phillip's probation was "to be supervised by 
[AP&P]." R.35. 
Accordingly, if AP&P wasn't supervising Mr. Phillip's probation during the 
alleged probation violations, then the alleged violations cannot support the revocation of 
Mr. Phillip's probation. In other words, Mr. Phillip can't be found to be in violation of 
supervised probation if AP&P wasn't supervising him. Furthermore, AP&P wasn't 
supervising Mr. Phillip. "If [Mr. Phillip] had been supervised [by AP&P] there would 
have been a record established" indicating so. R. 129:3. No such record was ever 
provided by AP&P. R. 129:1-32. 
In this matter, on April 15, 2011, Mr. Phillip pleaded guilty and the court 
sentenced him to complete 36 months of AP&P probation. R.34-36. Among the 
conditions of his probation were that probation was zero tolerance, that Mr. Phillip serve 
365 days in jail, that Mr. Phillip not use or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, and that Mr. 
Phillip not violate any laws. R.34-36; 136:5. Approximately one month later, Mr. Phillip 
was in court for an aggravated assault case where he was terminated from AP&P 
probation and a prison sentence was imposed. R.129:1-2, 9-10, 30. AP&P probation was 
never initiated in this matter because Mr. Phillip was in jail when he was sentenced, and 
he remained in jail until he was sentenced to prison for the Aggravated Assault matter. 
R.129:20. While Mr. Phillip was in prison, AP&P closed its file on Mr. Phillip's 
probation for this matter. R.129:9. It was not until mid-February of 2014, approximately 
34 months after Mr. Phillip was sentenced, that AP&P even knew about this matter and 
then quickly filed the initial affidavit dated February 20, 2015. R.48-52. 
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Because AP&P was not supervising Mr. Phillip for this matter, and this 
supervision was a necessary condition of his probation, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's finding that Mr. Phillip violated the terms of his probation. Furthermore, Mr. 
Phillip was prejudiced by the trial court's error because he is now serving an additional 
five-year-to-life prison sentence in addition to the zero-to-five-year prison sentence that 
initially started Mr. Phillip's prison stay. Lastly, this issue was preserved by defense 
counsel who stated, "because [Mr. Phillip] was not being supervised for his probation ... 
the Court shouldn't find he's in violation of his probation, [and] his probation should 
continue in this case." R.129:2; see also R.129:10-12. Defense counsel also highlighted 
that "the requirement of the court was that he be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole, 
and they closed that supervision." R.129:12. 
II. The district court erred in concluding that it could revoke Mr. Phillip's 
probation where the record indicates that Mr. Phillip did not willfully 
violate his probation. 
According to Utah Code Ann. 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii), "[u]pon a finding that the 
defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may order the probation 
revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew." 
Although Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1 does not specifically address whether the 
defendant's violation of a probation condition must be willful, this Court has held that "in 
order to revoke probation, a violation of a probation condition must, as a general rule, be 
willful." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270,276 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). This 
willfulness requirement falls under a due process right that is granted to criminal 
defendants that was acknowledged in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in Bearden v. 
10 
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). Specifically, Bearden made clear that "[t]he fundamental 
fairness requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the revocation of probation 
when a probationer has failed to pay restitution or a fine through no fault of his own." 
State v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, iJ 33, 127 P.3d 1213, 1221; see Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 
at 672. 
Underlying the willfulness requirement is the view that "'[a]s long as the 
defendant to whom leniency has been extended keeps faith with the court and the agency 
which supervises his probation, he is entitled to the benefits of the probation or 
suspension."' Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276. In addition, the willfulness requirement prevents 
a defendant from being terminated from probation for "problems beyond his control" Id. 
at 277; see also State v. Legg, 2014 UT App 80, ,r 10, 324 P.3d 656, 659 (to revoke 
probation, the trial court must first find by a preponderance of the evidence "that the 
violation was willful and not merely the result of circumstances beyond the probationer's 
control."). This willfulness requirement also entails that "a probationer be clearly and 
accurately apprised of the expectations for remaining on probation." Hodges, 798 P.2d at 
277. Thus, "probation conditions must be sufficiently precise and unambiguous to inform 
probationer of conduct essential to retain liberty." Id. at 277. 
Hodges reversed and remanded because the record did not adequately reveal that 
the defendant had willfully violated his probation. Hodges, 798 P.2d at 278. In Hodges, 
the record was not clear whether the defendant was unable to make adequate progress in 
sex offender treatment due to no fault of his own. Id. at 278 (defendant "was never 
informed that he had to make [treatment] progress at a certain rate regardless of fault"). 
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This Court reversed the probation revocation order, noting that the record failed to 
address whether the defendant's probation was revoked because of problems beyond or 
within his control. Id. 
A finding that a defendant has willfully violated his probation also necessitates 
that the trial court determine that a defendant has the requisite knowledge surrounding the 
conduct alleged in the probation violation. Legg, 2014 UT App 80, ,r 13. In other words, 
if a defendant lacks pertinent knowledge that is essential to the violation, there cannot be 
a finding of willfulness. Id. In Legg, the court concluded that the defendant lacked the 
requisite knowledge to show that he willfully violated probation for possessing a 
controlled substance when there was nothing in the record to support that the defendant 
had knowledge of the narcotic character of the substance that he possessed. Id. ("[i]f 
Legg had no idea what the substance at the bottom of his pill bottle was, then it cannot be 
said that he willfully violated his probation agreement by possessing a controlled 
substance."). 
Utah case law emphasizes that a finding of willfulness "merely requires a finding 
that the probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his 
probation." State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also State v. 
Robinson, 2014 UT App 114, ,r 16,327 P.3d 589, 593. Utah case law also makes clear 
that "the word willful should not be equated with the word intentional." State v. Johnson, 
2012 UT App 118, ,r 9, 276 P.3d 1254, 1257 (quotations omitted). Lastly, a "trial court's 
finding of willfulness may be implicit rather than explicit." Robinson, 2014 UT App 114, 
,r 16. 
12 
In this matter, the trial judge erred in terminating Mr. Phillip's probation when the 
record shows that Mr. Phillip did not willfully violate his probation. See Hodges, 798 
P.2d at 276. Applying Legg to the facts of this case, Mr. Phillip needed to have the 
requisite knowledge about the probation violation in order to support a finding that he 
willfully violated his probation. See Legg, 2014 UT App 80, if 13. This requisite 
knowledge is lacking in this matter because the record indicates that Mr. Phillip could not 
have known or believed that he was on probation during the time of the alleged conduct. 
R.129:5. That is, Mr. Phillip cannot willfully violate probation if he does not even know 
that he is on probation. He likewise cannot make bona fide efforts to meet the terms of 
his probation if he does not even know that he is on probation. See Bearden, 461 U.S. 
660, at 672. Thus, because the requisite knowledge requirement for willfulness was not 
met in this case, the trial court could not have found that Mr. Phillip willfully violated his 
probation. 
The record does not support that Mr. Phillip could have reasonably known or 
believed that he was on supervised probation for multiple reasons. First, there was no 
evidence provided that AP&P ever initially met with Mr. Phillip after he was sentenced 
in this matter to review the probation agreement and to have him sign the agreement. See 
R. 129:20. In fact, the record indicates that an initial meeting between Mr. Phillip and 
AP&P never occurred for this matter. Id. This initial meeting is a crucial first step that 
makes clear to a defendant what it means to be on supervised probation as opposed to 
court probation. Because this initial meeting between Mr. Phillip and AP&P never 
occurred, Mr. Phillip could not have reasonably known that he was on probation. 
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Second, the record does not indicate that there were any meetings with Mr. Phillip 
and AP&P at any time for this matter. Mr. Phillip was in jail at the start of this case and 
he remained in jail until he was sentenced to prison for his Aggravated Assault case. 
R.1 I, 26, 31; R.129:9, 30. There were no meetings with Mr. Phillip and AP&P about this 
matter at AP&P's place of business prior to Mr. Phillip's incarceration at the prison. See 
R.129:20. There were no visits by AP&P officials to Mr. Phillip about this matter while 
he was incarcerated at the jail or at the prison. See R.51; see also R.129:9, 20. There were 
no visits by AP&P to Mr. Phillip about this matter once Mr. Phillip was placed on parole 
for his other matter. Id. In fact, it was not until Mr. Phillip was placed on parole for his 
other matter that he had regular contact from AP&P officials. R.129: 1-4, 6, 12, 15, 21. 
Thus, AP&P never met with Mr. Phillip for this matter before he went to prison, while he 
was at the prison, or while he was on parole for his other case. R.50. This means that over 
the course of approximately three years, AP&P never met with Mr. Phillip about this 
matter. Mr. Phillip thus could not have reasonably known that he was on probation. 
Third, Mr. Phillip did not receive the instructions, communication, and assistance 
that AP&P typically provides. The duties of a probation officer are not just to report a 
defendant's probation violations to the court once they occur, but they are specifically 
tasked with communicating with a probationer in order to assist and help the probationer 
succeed. See Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-21, at Addendum B (probation officers have the 
following duties: "( a) monitoring, investigating, and supervising a parolee's or 
probationer's compliance with the conditions of the parole or probation agreement;"); see 
also US. v. Davis, 151 F.3d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1998) (a "[p]robation officer serves as 
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an investigative and supervisory arm of the [sentencing] court"). For example, "an AP&P 
agent is committed to helping offenders become productive members of the community" 
and "[t]he supervision of offenders transcends beyond ensuring that they comply with 
conditions of probation or parole ... [Probation] officers often must assist offenders with 
obtaining the basic essentials to survive. This may include housing, employment, school, 
training, food, treatment, therapy and counseling." About Adult Probation and Parole, 
( retrieved August 21, 2015), http://corrections.utah.gov/index. php? option=com _ content 
&view=articlee&id= 845 :adult-probation-parole&catid= 1 0&Itemid=262 ( emphasis 
added). As a result of these varying duties, probation officers will act in "the role of a 
police officer, court adviser, mentor and social worker." Id. Thus, AP&P's role is to 
provide both support and reminders to their probationers when needed, including 
reminders of the consequences of noncompliance, so that probationers have the best 
chance of succeeding on probation. 
This recognition of the role of probationers is also codified federally. According to 
18 U.S.C. § 3603, a "probation officer shall ... (3) use all suitable methods, not 
inconsistent with the conditions specified by the court, to aid a probationer or a person on 
supervised release who is under his supervision, and to bring about improvements in his 
conduct and condition ... [and] (10) perform any other duty that the court may designate." 
Probation officers also "monitor [offenders] through phone calls and personal contacts," 
and "direct them to services to help them - such as substance abuse or mental health 
treatment, medical care, training, or employment assistance- as ordered by the court." 
See Addendum B. Probation and Pretrial officers and Officer Assistants, Supervise 
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defendants and offenders in the community, (retrieved August 21, 2015), 
http://www.uscomis.gov /services-forms/probation-and- pretrial-services/probation -and-
pretrial-officers-and-officer. In completing these tasks, probation officers give 
probationers the best opportunity of succeeding on probation. 
In this matter, AP&P never communicated with or assisted Mr. Phillip with his 
probation. Even though AP&P was supervising his parole for the other case on materially 
the same conditions, Mr. Phillip was still not being supervised on this case. R.129:2-
3,4,6,12,15,21. Thus, AP&P was not conveying anything to Mr. Phillip about the specific 
requirements and possible positive and negative outcomes that would await Mr. Phillip 
depending upon his compliance or non-compliance/or this matter. Had AP&P been 
supervising Mr. Phillip on this matter after he was released from prison, they would have 
made clear to him that any non-compliance could result in a five-years-to-life prison 
term. Had AP&P been supervising Mr. Phillip they would have reminded him that any 
prison time imposed for this matter would add additional time to the prison time he faced 
for the matter for which he was on parole. In addition, if Mr. Phillip were being properly 
supervised on probation, AP&P would have reminded and emphasized to Mr. Phillip the 
ramifications of being placed on a zero-tolerance probation. 
Further, had AP&P been supervising Mr. Phillip, they would have reminded him 
that probation is different from parole because the consequences are different for the 
violations. See R.129:4. Mr. Phillip's counsel addressed these differences at the 
evidentiary hearing by stating that the "systems of supervision are different in that one is 




for the violation. One is an individual goes before the board, and the rest of their prison 
sentence is imposed. With regard to probation, an individual goes before the court, and 
then the court evaluates whether or not there has been a violation of those terms" to 
warrant probation being revoked and the prison term imposed. R.129:4. Had AP&P been 
supervising Mr. Phillip, they would have made clear that Mr. Phillip needed to go back 
before the trial judge and explain that he could not complete probation because he was in 
prison. Thus, because AP&P was not communicating or assisting Mr. Phillip in this 
matter, Mr. Phillip would have no reason to know or believe that he was on probation. 
Fourth, Mr. Phillip could not have reasonably known or believed that he was on 
probation for this matter when he was sentenced to prison for his other matter. That is, 
while serving time at the prison, he cannot successfully complete all of the requirements 
that are entailed in being on supervised probation. He has no freedom to drive to AP&P's 
place of business for check-ins. He also cannot secure employment as a means of paying 
off his court ordered fees. In addition, the trial court told him that he was placed on a 
zero-tolerance probation, which told Mr. Phillip that his probation would be revoked 
upon the first instance of a probation violation. R.35. 136:4-6. Thus, once Mr. Phillip was 
terminated from AP &P supervision and sentenced to prison for his Aggravated Assault 
matter, it would be reasonable for Mr. Phillip to believe that he was no longer on 
supervised probation. 3 
3 The court docket and pleadings for case number 091900040FS show that Mr. Phillip's 
AP&P probation in that matter was terminated because of the charges and plea in this 
matter. See supra note 1. 
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Fifth, Mr. Phillip could not have reasonably known or believed that he was on 
probation for this matter when he was paroled on his other matter. Once he was paroled 
for his other matter, he had contact and communication with AP&P officials for that 
matter. R. 129:2-3, 4, 6, 12, 15, 21. However, during this time that AP&P was 
supervising Mr. Phillip's parole, no AP&P official ever informed him that he was also on 
probation. Because AP&P was meeting with Mr. Phillip while he was on parole for the 
Aggravated Assault matter, and failed to inform him about this matter, Mr. Phillip would 
have reasonably believed that he was not on probation. Otherwise, AP&P would have 
informed him of such. 
Sixth, Mr. Phillip could not have reasonably known that he was on supervised 
probation because AP &P wasn't even aware about this case during the time that a 
number of the probation violations supposedly took place. That is, AP&P acknowledged 
that they didn't even know that Mr. Phillip was on probation until a week before 
February 20, 2014 because they had inadvertently closed this case in their computer 
system. R.51-52. Yet, the dates of the probation violation conduct alleged in the initial 
affidavit in allegations three through five ranged from December 4, 2013 to January 15, 
2014. R.48-49. Therefore, AP&P filed an affidavit listing that Mr. Phillip violated his 
probation for a series of dates when AP&P did not even know that Mr. Phillip was on 
probation. Once AP&P knew about this case, sometime around mid-February of 2014, 
they soon after filed the initial affidavit dated February 20, 2014. R.48-52. Thus, the first 
work that AP&P did on this case, other than inadvertently closing out the case, was to file 
an affidavit listing probation violations based on concerns that arose in Mr. Phillip's 
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parole matter. R.48-52. Because the only work that AP&P did on this case was to close it 
out in their computer system and then file an affidavit listing allegations against Mr. 
Phillip once they realized that their computer entry was made in error, Mr. Phillip could 
not have reasonably believed or known that he was on probation. Id. 
Thus, for multiple reasons, Mr. Phillip could not have reasonably known that he 
was on supervised probation for this matter. And, because Mr. Phillip did not know that 
he was on probation, the requisite knowledge requirement needed for showing that he 
willfully violated his probation was not met in this matter. See Legg, 2014 UT App 80, ,r 
13. In addition, because Mr. Phillip did not even know that he was on probation during 
the time of the alleged probation violation conduct, the trial judge improperly terminated 
his probation for issues that were beyond Mr. Phillip's control. See Hodges, 798 P.2d at 
277. That is, Mr. Phillip cannot meet the terms of his supervised probation ifhe does not 
know that he is even on probation. The trial judge therefore erred in revoking Mr. 
Phillip's probation in this matter because the record indicates that Mr. Phillip did not 
willfully violate his probation. 
The trial court's error in revoking probation where the record failed to show that 
Mr. Phillip willfully violated his probation requires reversal. The error deprived Mr. 
Phillip of a fundamental due process right. See Holmes v. S. Carolina, 547 U.S. 319,324 
(2006); see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. a 672. Because the error "result[ed] in the 
deprivation of a constitutional right, [this Court] [should] apply a higher standard of 
scrutiny, reversing the conviction unless [it] find[s] the error harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt."' State v. Crowley, 2014 UT App 33, ,r17, 320 P.3d 677. But even if a 
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lesser standard is appropriate, reversal is required as the trial court's error was not 
harmless. See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ,I 45, 55 P.3d 573, 589. ("Notwithstanding 
error by the trial court, we will not reverse a conviction if we find that the error was 
harm I ess. "). 
Mr. Phillip is prejudiced because he will now be serving additional time at the 
prison because of the trial judge's finding. R. 129:7. The district court judge 
acknowledged that a finding of a probation violation in this matter would "carry a greater 
consequence" for Mr. Phillip than if he was serving time at the prison for only the case 
where the zero-to-five year sentence was imposed. R. 129:7. Here, because the trial judge 
found that Mr. Phillip violated his probation in this case, the court imposed the five-
years-to-Iife prison term, which Mr. Phillip is currently serving at the Utah State Prison. 
Id. If, however, the trial court had found that Mr. Phillip could not be revoked on 
probation because he did not willfully violate his probation, then the Utah Board of 
Pardons would not currently have jurisdiction over this matter and Mr. Phillip would only 
be serving time for his other matter. Thus, the trial court's finding prejudiced Mr. Phillip 
because he is now required to serve much more time at the Utah State Prison because of 
the five-years-to-life prison term issued by the trial court in this matter. Id. 
This issue was preserved. R. 129:5, 21-25. This Court "will not address an issue if 
it is not preserved or if the appellant has not established other grounds for seeking 
review." State in interest of C.C., 2013 UT 26, ,I16, 301 P.3d 1000 (quotations omitted). 
To preserve an issue for appeal, "the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a 
way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Id. (quotations omitted). 
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"An issue may be raised directly or indirectly, so long as it is raised to a level of 
consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it." Hill v. Superior Prop. Mgmt. 
Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60, ,r57 (quotations omitted); see also Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 
,r24, 164 P.3d 366 (concluding that an issue was preserved because the trial court "was 
aware" of the issue and specifically resolved it in a "deliberate manner," even though the 
trial "court did not have the benefit of the [appellants'] argument"). 
In this matter, Mr. Phillip's counsel preserved this issue by indirectly arguing that 
Mr. Phillip did not willfully violate his probation. R.129:5. Specifically, defense counsel 
argued that "there's an inherent need in due process of an individual being supervised, [of 
him] receiving notices of his violations, and [ of him] knowing that the consequences that 
will flow will be the violation of his probation." R.129:5 (emphasis added). And, even 
though Mr. Phillip's counsel couched his argument by stating that Mr. Phillip did not 
receive adequate notice of the probation violations, the effect of counsel's argument was 
to draw attention to the issue that Mr. Phillip did not willfully violate his probation. 
R.129:5. That is, defense counsel raised the concern that because Mr. Phillip did not even 
know that he was on probation during the time period of the probation violations, it 
followed that Mr. Phillip did not willfully violate his probation. Thus, defense counsel 
preserved this issue because although he did not use the word "willful," he "raised to a 
level of consciousness" the issue of whether Mr. Phillip's could have willfully violated 
his probation ifhe did not even know that he was on probation. See Hill, 2013 UT 60, 
,rs1. 
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In addition, this issue is preserved because the trial judge was aware of it. R.129: 
21-25. During the evidentiary hearing, the trial judge asked, "But if, in fact, [Mr. 
Phillip] was never given a condition of probation, could [he] violate it if [he] did not 
know what it was?" R. 129:21. This question shows that the trial court understood that a 
probation violation must be willful. Thus, applying Pratt, this question posed by the trial 
judge reveals that he "was aware" of the issue, even if counsel did not directly address 
the issue of willfulness. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, if24. 
Nevertheless, if this Court finds that this issue was not preserved, this Court may 
review it for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. Plain error requires reversal 
where "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and 
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome ... " State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). First, as 
explained previously, an error exists because the trial court terminated Mr. Phillip's 
probation and imposed a prison term when the record showed that Mr. Phillip did not 
willfully violate his probation. See supra at 10-19; see also R.129: 1-32. 
Second, the error was obvious. The "obviousness requirement poses no rigid and 
insurmountable barrier to review." See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah), cert 
denied, Eldredge v. Utah, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Mr. Phillip need only "show that the law 
governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." State v. Dean, 
2004 UT 63, if 16, 95 P.3d 276. Here, the error should have been obvious to the trial court 
as the willfulness requirement of Hodges is well established Utah case law and a due 
process right under U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 
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at 672; see also Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276. In addition, the trial court raised a concern 
about the knowledge requirement of a willfulness analysis by asking, "[b Jut if, in fact, 
[Mr. Phillip] was never given a condition of probation, could [he] violate it if [he] did not 
know what it was?" R. 129:21. Thus, the issue that Mr. Phillip's probation violation was 
not willful should have been obvious to the trial court based upon a question asked by the 
trial court. Id. 
Third, the error was prejudicial. An error is prejudicial when "'there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome"' "'absent the error."' State v. Cox, 
2012 UT App 234, ,r2. In addition, an error is prejudicial ifthere is "a probability 
sufficient to undermine [the Court's] confidence in the outcome." State v. Ott, 2010 UT 
1, ,I40, 247 P.3d 344. Such error occurs when its effect on the trial is "'pervasive"' rather 
than "'isolated"' and "'trivial."' Id. In this case, there was a reasonable probability of a 
different result but for the errors. 
Mr. Phillip has been prejudiced by the trial court's finding that it could revoke his 
probation when Mr. Phillip had not willfully violated his probation. The court violated 
Mr. Phillip's probation and imposed the five-year-to-life prison term, which Mr. Phillip is 
currently serving at the Utah State Prison. R. 129:7. If, however, the trial court had found 
that Mr. Phillip could not be revoked on probation because he did not willfully violate his 
probation, then the Utah Board of Pardons would not currently have jurisdiction over this 
matter and Mr. Phillip would only be serving time for his other matter. Thus, the trial 
court's finding prejudiced Mr. Phillip because he is now required to serve much more 
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time at the Utah State Prison because of the five-year-to-life prison term issued by the 
trial court in this matter. See R.129:7. 
If this Court finds that this issue was not preserved, this Court may also review it 
for ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a 
defendant must first, "'identify specific acts or omissions demonstrating that counsel's 
representation failed to meet an objective standard of reasonableness.'" State v. Montoya, 
2004 UT 5, ,r24, 84 P.3d 1183. In evaluating counsel's performance, "an ineffective 
assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be 
surmised from counsel's actions." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). Second, a defendant must show that "'but for counsel's deficient performance 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different."' 
Montoya, 2004 UT 5, at ,r23. 
In this matter, if counsel failed to raise the issue that Mr. Phillip did not willfully 
violate his probation, his performance was deficient when the facts indicated that Mr. 
Phillip did not willfully violate his probation. The willfulness requirement is a strong 
protection afforded to Mr. Phillip under established U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
and Utah case law. See Bearden, 461 U.S. 660, at 668; see also Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276. 
In addition, in applying Legg, the willfulness requirement could not have been met 
because Mr. Phillip did not even know that he was probation during the time period that 
he was accused of violating his probation. See Legg, 2014 UT App 80, ,r 13. Thus, if 
counsel failed to point out that Mr. Phillip did not willfully violate his probation, then his 
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performance would fall well below the objective standard of reasonableness. State v. 
Montoya, 2004 UT 5, iJ24, 84 P.3d 1183. 
Furthermore, there would be no strategic choice by defense counsel to fail to insist 
that the willfulness requirement was not met in this matter. See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 
468 (a strategic choice must be reasonable). A choice is not strategic if counsel simply 
fails to perform an important task. See State v. Moore, 2012 UT 62, iJiJ7-9, 289 P.3d 487 
( counsel performed deficiently when he failed to use important defense evidence that he 
had access to); State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688, 691-92 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (counsel 
performed deficiently when he "overlooked the statutory presumption by failing to check 
the 'pocket-part' of the Utah Code"). In this case, there would be "no tactical explanation 
for" counsel to permit the trial judge revoke Mr. Phillip's probation when the record 
showed that Mr. Phillip did not willfully violate it. See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468. Thus, 
there was no potential upside to failing to bring up the willfulness requirement, only 
downside. Creating a scenario that is all downside for one's client is not a legitimate trial 
strategy. Therefore, if counsel failed to point out that defendant did not willfully violate 
his probation, he performed deficiently. 
Second, if Mr. Phillip's counsel failed to preserve this issue, then Mr. Phillip was 
prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance as there was a reasonable probability of a 
different outcome but for the deficient performance. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (the prejudice analysis for plain error and ineffective assistance is 
the same). That is, Mr. Phillip's probation would not have been terminated because there 
was no willful violation. And, as previously mentioned, Mr. Phillip was prejudiced by the 
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trial judge's error in this matter because he is now serving an additional five-year-to-life 
prison sentence in addition to the zero-to-five-year prison sentence that initially started 
Mr. Phillip's prison stay. Therefore, this Court should reverse because if counsel failed to 
argue that the trial judge could not revoke Mr. Phillip's probation because willfulness 
was lacking in this matter, this would clearly constitute ineffective assistance. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above, Mr. Phillip respectfully asks this Court to reverse the 
district court's revocation of his probation and remand for further proceedings. 
/
~f 
SUBMITTED this____, ___ day of December, 2015. 
TERESA L. WELCH 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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Counsel argues the conditions of the defendant's probation. 
2,27 
Mr, Leavitt proffers evidence. 
2.29 
The Court finds the defendant violated terms 3-6 and 8-10. 
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Case No: 101909538 Date: Mar 20, 2015 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years and which 
may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKB County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined, 
The c!efendant 1 s probation i's revoked. 
The defendant•e probation is terminated unsuccessfully, 
CUSTODY 
The defendant is present in the custody of the Department of Corrections Utah State 
Prison - Draper. 
Date: ~-1.0· \C"::J 











Utah Code §77-18-1 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence -- Pleas held in abeyance -- Probation --
Supervision -- Presentence investigation -- Standards -- Confidentiality-- Terms and 
conditions -- Termination, revocation, modification, or extension -- Hearings --
Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea 
in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) 
(3) 
(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty with a mental illness, no contest, or conviction of 
any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the 
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may 
place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b) 
(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the 
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation 
standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be 
based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the results of a risk and needs assessment; 
(iii) the demand for services; 
(iv) the availability of agency resources; 
(v) public safety; and 
(vi) other criteria established by the department to determine what level 
of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the 
Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for 
review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
( c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
( d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other 
criteria as they consider appropriate. 
( e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact 
report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to 
supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions 
or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. 
However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in 
accordance with department standards. 
(5) 
(a) Before the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence 
of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable 
period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from 
the department or information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
(i) a victim impact statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-
38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's 
family; 
(ii) a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a 
recommendation from the department regarding the payment of restitution 
with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act; 
(iii) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender 
conducted under Section 77-18-1.1; 
(iv) recommendations for treatment of the offender; and 
(v) the number of days since the commission of the offense that the 
offender has spent in the custody of the jail and the number of days, if any, 
the offender was released to a supervised release or alternative 




( c) The contents of the presentence investigation report are protected and are 
not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule 
of the Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the 
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the 
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any 
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been 
resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to 
the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional 10 
working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. 
If after 10 working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make 
a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation 
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the 
appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open 
court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the 
defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is 
legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment 
program in which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is 
acceptable to the court; 
(v) serve a period oftime, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation by the 
court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of 
electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including 
the compensatory service program provided in Section 76-6-107.1; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 3 8a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation 
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's 
own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED 
certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b )(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by 
Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 
during: 
(10) 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with 
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with 
Subsection ( 10). 
(a) 
(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, 12 months in cases of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions, or as allowed pursuant to Section 64-13-21 
regarding earned credits. 
(ii) 
(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (I0)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon 
the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court 
may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on 
bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of 
the account receivable. If the court retains jurisdiction for this 







court the costs associated with continued probation under this 
Subsection (10). 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in 
the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, 
prosecutor, victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the 
defendant to show cause why the defendant's failure to pay should 
not be treated as contempt of court. 
(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State 
Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all 
cases when termination of supervised probation is being requested by the 
department or will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to 
revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke 
the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the 
hearing. 
(iii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation constitutes service of time toward a 
term of incarceration imposed as a result of the revocation of probation. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation 
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation 





(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that 
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is 
justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why the defendant's probation should 
not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed if the 
defendant is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) 
(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning 
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in the 
defendant's own behalf, and present evidence. 
(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, 
or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If a period of incarceration is imposed for a violation, the defendant 
shall be sentenced within the guidelines established by the Utah Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to Subsection 63M-7-404(4), unless the judge 
determines that: 
(A) the defendant needs substance abuse or mental health 
treatment, as determined by a risk and needs assessment, that 
warrants treatment services that are immediately available in the 
community; or 
(B) the sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(iv) If the defendant had, prior to the imposition of a term of 
incarceration or the execution of the previously imposed sentence under 
this Subsection (12), served time in jail as a condition of probation or due 
to a violation of probation under Subsection 77-18-1(12)(e)(iii), the time 
the probationer served in jail constitutes service of time toward the sentence 
previously imposed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself or herself to the custody of 
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State 
Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of 
the Utah State Hospital or the superintendent's designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state 
hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for 
treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
( 14) Presentence investigation reports are classified protected in accordance with Title 
63G, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding 
Sections 630-2-403 and 630-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of 
sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence 
investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 630-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the 




( c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the 
subject's authorized representative; or 
( e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the 
disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to statements or 
materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including 
statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the victim or the 
victim's household. 
(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation 
under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 
and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the 
department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may 
order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate 
law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
( c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which 
require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
( d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through 
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the 
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of 
the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic 
monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the 
court. 
( f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this 
section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
Utah Code §64-13-21 
64-13-21. Supervision of sentenced offenders placed in community -- Rulemaking --
POST certified parole or probation officers and peace officers -- Duties --
Supervision fee. 
(1) (a) The department, except as otherwise provided by law, shall supervise sentenced 
offenders placed in the community on probation by the courts, on parole by the 
Board of Pardons and Parole, or upon acceptance for supervision under the terms 
of the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers. 
(b) Standards for the supervision of offenders shall be established by the department 
in accordance with sentencing guidelines, including the graduated sanctions 
matrix, established by the Utah Sentencing Commission, giving priority, based on 
available resources, to felony offenders and offenders sentenced pursuant to 
Subsection 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii). 
(2) The department shall apply graduated sanctions established by the Utah Sentencing 
Commission to facilitate a prompt and appropriate response to an individual's 
violation of the terms of probation or parole, including: 
(a) sanctions to be used in response to a violation of the terms of probation or parole; 
and 
(b) requesting approval from the court or Board of Pardons and Parole to impose a 
sanction for an individual's violation of the terms of probation or parole, for a 
period of incarceration of not more than three consecutive days and not more than 
a total of five days within a period of 30 days. 
(3) The department shall implement a program of graduated incentives as established by 
the Utah Sentencing Commission to facilitate the department's prompt and 
appropriate response to an offender's: 
(a) compliance with the terms of probation or parole; or 
(b) positive conduct that exceeds those terms. 
(4) (a) The department shall, in collaboration with the Commission on Criminal and 
Juvenile Justice and the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health, create 
standards and procedures for the collection of information, including cost savings 
related to recidivism reduction and the reduction in the number of inmates, related 
to the use of the graduated sanctions and incentives, and offenders' outcomes. 
(b) The collected information shall be provided to the Commission on Criminal and 
Juvenile Justice not less frequently than annually on or before August 31. 
(5) Employees of the department who are POST certified as law enforcement officers or 
correctional officers and who are designated as parole and probation officers by the 
executive director have the following duties: 
(a) monitoring, investigating, and supervising a parolee's or probationer's compliance 
with the conditions of the parole or probation agreement; 
(b) investigating or apprehending any offender who has escaped from the custody of 
the department or absconded from supervision; 
( c) providing investigative services for the courts, the department, or the Board of 
Pardons and Parole; 
( d) supervising any offender during transportation; or 
( e) collecting DNA specimens when the specimens are required under Section 53-10-
404. 
(6) (a) A monthly supervision fee of $30 shall be collected from each offender on 
probation or parole. The fee may be suspended or waived by the department upon 
a showing by the offender that imposition would create a substantial hardship or 
if the offender owes restitution to a victim. 
(b) (i) The department shall make rules in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3. 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, specifying the criteria for suspension 
or waiver of the supervision fee and the circumstances under which an 
offender may request a hearing. 
(ii) In determining whether the imposition of the supervision fee would 
constitute a substantial hardship, the department shall consider the financial 
resources of the offender and the burden that the fee would impose, with 
regard to the offender's other obligations. 
(7) (a) The department shall establish a program allowing an offender on probation 
under Section 77-18-1 or on parole under Subsection 76-3-202(1)(a) to earn 
credits for the offender's compliance with the terms of the offender's probation or 
parole, which shall be applied to reducing the period of probation or parole as 
provided in this Subsection Q}. 
(b) The program shall provide that an offender earns a reduction credit of 30 days 
from the offender's period of probation or parole for each month the offender 
completes without any violation of the terms of the offender's probation or parole 
agreement, including the case action plan. 
( c) The department shall maintain a record of credits earned by an offender under this 
Subsection ill and shall request from the court or the Board of Pardons and 
Parole the termination of probation or parole not fewer than 30 days prior to the 
termination date that reflects the credits earned under this Subsection ill-
( d) This Subsection ill does not prohibit the department from requesting a 
termination date earlier than the termination date established by earned credits 
under Subsection ~-
( e) The court or the Board of Pardons and Parole shall terminate an offender's 
probation or parole upon completion of the period of probation or parole accrued 
by time served and credits earned under this Subsection (Z} unless the court or the 
Board of Pardons and Parole finds that termination would interrupt the 
completion of a necessary treatment program, in which case the termination of 
probation or parole shall occur when the treatment program is completed. 
(f) The department shall report annually to the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile 
Justice on or before August 31: 
(i) the number of offenders who have earned probation or parole credits under 
this Subsection ill in one or more months of the preceding fiscal year and the 
percentage of the offenders on probation or parole during that time that this 
number represents; 
(ii) the average number of credits earned by those offenders who earned credits; 
(iii) the number of offenders who earned credits by county of residence while on 
probation or parole; 
(iv) the cost savings associated with sentencing reform programs and practices; 
and 
(v) a description of how the savings will be invested in treatment and early-
intervention programs and practices at the county and state levels. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure - Rule 11 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by 
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be 
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, 
or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not 
guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation 
fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
( c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A 
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other 
than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for 
making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, 
and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
( e )( 1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the 
right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
( e )(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, 
the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right 
to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights 
are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
( e )( 4 )(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient 
evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
( e )( 6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if 
so, what agreement has been reached; 
( e )(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
the plea; and 
( e )(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a 
written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant 
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant 
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been 
read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or 
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-
13-6. 
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall 
advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the 
defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to 
advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
(h)(l) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request 
or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of 
other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the 
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(i)(l)The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being 
made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting 
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the 
plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to 
either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
G) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a 
conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record 
the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any 
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other 
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to 
determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-
103. 
(I) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. 
Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient 
grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
18 U.S. Code § 3603 - Duties of probation officers 
A probation officer shall-
( I) instruct a probationer or a person on supervised release, who is under his supervision, 
as to the conditions specified by the sentencing court, and provide him with a written 
statement clearly setting forth all such conditions; 
(2) keep informed, to the degree required by the conditions specified by the sentencing 
court, as to the conduct and condition of a probationer or a person on supervised release, 
who is under his supervision, and report his conduct and condition to the sentencing 
court; 
(3) use all suitable methods, not inconsistent with the conditions specified by the court, to 
aid a probationer or a person on supervised release who is under his supervision, and to 
bring about improvements in his conduct and condition; 
( 4) be responsible for the supervision of any probationer or a person on supervised 
release who is known to be within the judicial district; 
(5) keep a record of his work, and make such reports to the Director of the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts as the Director may require; 
( 6) upon request of the Attorney General or his designee, assist in the supervision of and 
furnish information about, a person within the custody of the Attorney General while on 
work release, furlough, or other authorized release from his regular place of confinement, 
or while in prerelease custody pursuant to the provisions of section 3624(c); 
(7) keep informed concerning the conduct, condition, and compliance with any condition 
of probation, including the payment of a fine or restitution of each probationer under his 
supervision and report thereon to the court placing such person on probation and report to 
the court any failure of a probationer under his supervision to pay a fine in default within 
thirty days after notification that it is in default so that the court may determine whether 
probation should be revoked; 
(8) (A) 
when directed by the court, and to the degree required by the regimen of care or treatment 
ordered by the court as a condition of release, keep informed as to the conduct and 
provide supervision of a person conditionally released under the provisions of section 
4243 or 4246 of this title, and report such person's conduct and condition to the court 
ordering release and to the Attorney General or his designee; and 
(B) 
immediately report any violation of the conditions of release to the court and the Attorney 
General or his designee; 
(9) 
if approved by the district court, be authorized to carry firearms under such rules and 
regulations as the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may 
prescribe; and 
(10) 
perform any other duty that the court may designate. 
(Added Pub. L. 98-473, title II,§ 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2002; amended Pub. 
L. 99-646, § 15{a). Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3595; Pub. L. 102-572, title VII,§ 70I(a). 
Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4514; Pub. L. 104-317, title I,§ IOI(a). Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 
3848.) 
